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1 Introduction 
Increasing critical infrastructure (CI) resilience is a 
European strategy to enhance safety and security. 
Resilience is a response to the increased complexity 
in interconnected and interdependent complex socio-
technical systems, organizations and society. The re-
silience concept is broad, a variety of definitions are 
used, and it is applied in different research areas. It 
addresses the ability of a system/organization to con-
tinue operations both under expected and unexpected 
conditions. Resilience can be defined as the ability of 
a system to maintain and adapt its operational perfor-
mance in the face of failures and other adverse con-
ditions (Laprie 2005; Strigini 2012). A current EU 
project define resilience of an infrastructure as 
(Vollmer et al, 2016): "the ability to understand 
risks, anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing 
conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover 
rapidly from disruption". The main aspects of similar 
definitions are 'absorb shocks', 'ability to adapt', and 
'ability to recover' or ‘bounce-back'. Another defini-
tion focusing on safety management to cope with 
complexity under pressure to achieve dependability, 
safety, continuity and regularity are "the intrinsic 
ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to 
or following changes and disturbances, so that it can 
sustain operations even after a major mishap or in 
the presence of continuous stress" (Hollnagel, 
Woods & Leveson 2006). According to Westrum 
(2006), the main aspects are the ability to 'foresee 
and avoid' – incident/ accident prevention, 'cope with 
ongoing trouble' – to prevent an incidence from 
becoming worse, 'repairing after catastrophe' – to 
recover once it has happened. 
This paper focuses on digitalization of a critical 
infrastructure in the rail transport sector - GSM-R 
(Global System for Mobile Communication-Rail-
way) which is radio communication between infra-
structure system, engine and control centers. A Nor-
wegian case study illustrates experiences from a 
resilience perspective and focuses on both the imple-
mentation phase and long-term effects of the innova-
tion. 
1.1 Resilient guidelines 
OECD (2014) resilience guidelines focus on devel-
oping countries. It is a step-by-step guidance on how 
to analyze risk and build a roadmap to resilience. 
However, OECD support development of similar 
guidelines in contexts prone to e.g. natural, climate, 
economic and/or geo-political shocks. The purpose 
of guidelines is to enable effective development. 
The argument for clarifying resilient perspectives 
and using resilient principles is that people, institu-
tions and states need the right tools, assets and skills 
to deal with an increasingly complex, interconnected 
and evolving risk landscape, while retaining the abil-
ity to seize opportunities to increase overall well-be-
ing (OECD, Ibid). 
However, it is noticed that translation of the idea 
into good practice has not been easy. One problem is 
to have the right tools to systematically analyze re-
silience, and then integrate resilience aspects into 
strategical and operative programs. 
1.2 Standardization of rail critical infrastructure 
One argument for implementing European standards 
in the rail sector is the enablement of common trans-
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border railway transport allows trains to travel in any 
European country. The difference between national 
systems in European railway has been significant. A 
standardized system should improve the interopera-
bility between networks and systems. 
  
Figure 1. GSM-R infrastructure. (Norwegian National Rail Ad-
ministration, 2005) 
 
Today, a European standard regarding a common 
signaling system - ERTMS (European Railway Traf-
fic Management System) - is to be introduced in all 
EU countries by 2030.  This paper focuses on a com-
ponent of ERTMS, that is GSM-R (Global System 
for Mobile Communication-Railway). GSM-R is a 
radio communication system for direct communica-
tion between engine and network operator. In addi-
tion to GSM-R, ERTMS includes ETCS (European 
Train Control System) and common European traffic 
regulation.  
Standardization of GSM-R was designed to re-
place an analogue communication system with a dig-
ital system. 
 
2 The Rail Case Study 
The study presented in this paper is implementation 
of GSM-R in Norway in the period 2003 – 2006, and 
an evaluation of the effects. Norway was one of the 
first countries in Europe implementing an operative 
GSM-R system on the total rail network (Bane NOR, 
2007). 
The GSM-R infrastructure replaced the analogue 
system with a new digital emergency warning instal-
lation. The system shall ensure radio communication 
in both emergencies and ordinary operation. The in-
frastructure includes both voice and data communi-
cation via antennas and fiber (see Figure 1). GSM-R 
is based on the mobile standard GSM.  
It is argued that a joint rail communication system 
would satisfy a list of rail specific requirements re-
garding safety and availability. 
2.1 Implementation of GSM-R in Norway 
The GSM-R project covers totally 3,900 km railway 
lines and 650 base stations, inclusive transmission. 
The infrastructure cover one pole with antenna and a 
radio box on each 6 km rail line. To ensure radio 
communication in about 600 tunnels was considered 
one of the biggest challenges (Bane NOR, ibid).  
The implementation was done in two stages. 
Lines without authorized emergency communica-
tion, as requested by The Norwegian Railway Au-
thority, was prioritized first. At the time being, these 
lines were operating on time limited permission. 
Trains, working machinery and Traffic Control Cen-
ters was equipped with new user equipment when 
GSM-R was put into operation on a section. 
The most important GSM-R function is safe com-
munication between train driver and traffic control-
ler. A controller should always get quickly in contact 
with the right train. Further, the net is closed and lim-
ited to rail related radio communication. Thus, nor 
was travelers' mobile communication improved, nor 
should public mobile communication interrupt the 
rail communication. On the other hand, commercial 
tele operators would be allowed to use the infrastruc-
ture to improve mobile coverage onboard trains.  
 
3 Evaluation of Infrastructure Projects 
The Concept Research Program in Norway covers 
research related to effects of major public invest-
ments. Concept is founded by the Norwegian Minis-
try of Finance. Most Concept evaluations of invest-
ment in new critical infrastructure projects have 
measured effects like cost, time and quality. These 
are defined goals as an immediate result of the im-
plementation project. In addition, several recent re-
search projects also include ex post evaluations of in-
vestments projects. 
3.1 Three levels of success 
Projects successful may be evaluated in different 
ways. Effects may be classified along a continuum 
from short- to long-term. Samset & Volden (2013) 
distinguish between three levels of success: (1) Op-
erational success: The delivery of the project is as 
promised and is both time- and cost efficient. (2) 
Tactical success: The project produces the maximum 
utility/benefit for the users at the lowest possible 
cost. (3) Strategic success: The project contributes to 
a desired societal development (as expressed by its 
long-term objective), at the lowest possible cost and 
in a financially sustainable manner. The three levels 
of achievements correspond to the project manage-
ment literature, i.e. (1) the outputs (project delivery), 
(2) the outcome (first-order effects for users), and (3) 
societal objective (wide and long-term effect for so-
ciety (see Figure 2). 
 
 
In practice, most of the focus has been on operational 
success. However, since major public investments 
typically have a broad societal perspective, the as-
sessment of tactical and strategic performance may 
be vital aspects of the assessment of their success. 
3.2 Evaluation model 
The objective of the evaluation of the GSM-R project 
is to measure long-term effects of investment in 
changes of a critical rail infrastructure. The Concept 
program has developed and tested a model for post-
evaluation on several CI projects. This evaluation 
model is used as guidelines when evaluating the 
GSM-R implementation. The evaluation model is a 
broad, goal-oriented evaluation model recommended 
by international organizations, including the OECD, 
in combination with economic analysis (Volden & 
Samset, 2017).  
The model covers six general evaluation criteria 
(see Figure 3): (1) Efficiency. This is a measure of 
the project’s implementation: how effectively the 
project organization has converted resources to de-
liveries. This includes an assessment of the project’s 
outputs in terms of cost, time and quality. (2) Effec-
tiveness. This concerns whether the agreed outcomes 
(or first-order effects) were reached and to what ex-
tent the project contributed to this outcome. (3) Other 
impacts. This includes all effects beyond the in-
tended effects (the outcome) that can be attributed as 
the result of the project, positive and negative, short-
term and long-term, and for different stakeholders 
and affected parties. (4) Relevance. A project is rel-
evant if there is a need for it. Project relevance is 
measured in relation to needs and priorities as ex-
pressed politically and by stakeholders and affected 
parties. (5) Sustainability. A project is sustainable if 
its positive effects are likely to persist throughout its 
lifetime. (6) Socio-economic efficiency. This can be 
measured in terms of either the users’ willingness to 
pay in relation to cost (profitability) or the outcome 
in relation to cost (often denoted as cost-effective-
ness). 
 
3.3 GSM-R - Evaluation method 
The evaluation is based on document analysis and in-
terviews of key stakeholders with central roles in the 
planning, implementation and operation of GSM-R.  
Totally three individual and three focus in depth 
interviews were accomplished in the period from 
September 2018 to January 2019. Most were face-to-
face interviews, and one was using Skype. Each 
lased from one to two hours. A semi-structured 
guideline based on the Concept Post-evaluation 
model was used to ensure all aspects were taken into 
consideration.  
The documents include descriptions of the GSM-
R project, an up-front report based on external qual-




4.1 Safety – A central argument for the CI 
implementation 
Documents and interviews indicate that safety is the 
main argument and objective for implementing 
GSM-R in Norway. The Åsta rail accident in 2000 
are attributed as a triggering factor for deciding to 
replace the old and analogue system with a new and 
digital rail infrastructure in Norway. Because of the 
collision between two trains, 19 persons died, and 
several was seriously injured. 
The accident had major influence on rail safety 
development and several safety measures were im-
plemented, including GSM-R. The system should 
ensure communication in both emergencies and daily 
operations. 
4.2 Operational success of GSM-R 
implementation 
Efficiency is a measure of operational success and 
covers the project’s outputs in terms of (1) time, (2) 
 
Figure 2. Three levels of efficiency. (Samset & Volden, 2013) 
 
Figure 3. Concept Post-evaluation model. (Volden & Samset, 
2017) 
cost and (3) quality. Documents and interviews indi-
cate that these was within the estimated indications. 
The documents and interviews indicate two main 
challenges during the implementation phase. First, 
before the implementation some lines were operated 
without any authorized emergency communication 
systems. These operated on time-limited license. 
This challenge was regarded as safety critical.  
The interviews indicate that the quality of the an-
alogue system was old and outdated and had to be 
replaced by a digital platform. 
Regarding time, the implementation was planned 
as a two-step process. Phase 1 – sections without 
prior train radio communication – was completed as 
planned in 2005. Phase 2 – the rest of Norwegian rail 
net – was completed by 2007. This was also com-
pleted within to the planned time period. 
Another challenge was related to costs and qual-
ity; the absence of radio connection in tunnels. Some 
additional costs related to radio communication in 
tunnels and installations were anticipated. These 
costs were slightly overrun, compared to prior esti-
mates. 
4.3 Tactical success 
Tactical success covers two criteria of the Concept 
Post-evaluation model – Effectiveness and Socio-
economic efficiency. 
(1) Effectiveness is the criteria that is of most in-
terest in this paper. The main agreed outcomes (or 
first-order effects) of GSM-R implementation was 
safe and efficient train conveying. The question is if 
these objectives were reached and to what extent the 
project contributed to this outcome. 
Train collisions are the third most severe rail ac-
cidents type in Europe, after Rolling stock in motion 
and Level-crossings (Stene, 2018). These are the ac-
cidents with highest number of persons killed or in-
jured. The most frequent cause of fatal train acci-
dents is signal passed at danger. This is also the case 
for the Åsta accident. Further, the infrastructure sys-
tem neither included any alarm about the critical sit-
uation prior to the accident, nor functioned as an 
emergency communication support after it took 
place. 
One question is whether the infrastructure serves 
as a barrier. A barrier may be defined as "measure 
which reduces the probability of realizing a hazards 
potential for harm and reducing its consequence. 
Barriers may be physical or non-physical (proce-
dures, inspection, training or drill)" (ISO 17776 
2000). According to Elvenes (2013) GSM-R may 
function as a safety measure in combination to other 
systems. However, alone this is not a safety barrier 
preventing fatal accidents. In the pre-crash period 
GSM-R may be a significant medium for warning if 
undesirable situation is evolving. Train driver and 
train operation manager will have the possibility to 
alert and communicate directly with each other.  
As one safety element, GSM-R may have a sig-
nificant function in the post-crash period (Elvenes, 
Ibid). As a prevention measure, it is argued that the 
most relevant accident type is collisions between 
trains. It may also have a minor safety effect regard-
ing derailments, collisions with objects, and persons 
at the platform or on the track.  
To what extent GSM-R has contributed to fewer 
rail incidents and accidents are not clear. One reason 
is that accidents are rarely occurring. Thus, it is sta-
tistically hard to validate a reduction.  
 
Figure 4 show a clear decline in the number of re-
ported operational accidents after 2003, but with an 
increase trend after 2008. The number of injured and 
dead is relatively constant. Each severe incident/ ac-
cident was reported, and an inquiry completed. In 
GSM-R the implementation phase 2003 – 2006, no 
severe accidents are reported. After this, the figure 
indicates an increase of accidents. One reason given 




Figure 5 illustrates the three most frequent incidents 
categories after 2007. Incidents and near misses may 
Figure 5. Operational accidents 2007 – 2017 – The three most 
frequent incidents. (Source: The Norwegian Rail Authority)  
Figure 4: Number of accidents and injured/ killed in Norwegian 
rail in the period 1997 – 2017. (Source: The Norwegian Rail 
Authority)  
indicate a trend. However, incident reporting was not 
mandatory and systematic in Norway before the Åsta 
accident. One of the measures afterwards is a man-
datory registration of severe incidents from 2006. 
These are undesirable rail incidents that (under other 
conditions) may have resulted in an accident. The ar-
gument was learning and improvement from these, 
contributing to prevention, lessons learned and im-
proved safety. 
However, the focus interview with the operational 
personnel (engine drivers) indicates that GSM-R in-
cludes communication artefacts (internal mobile 
phones, emergency button etc.) have contributed to 
accident prevention, and thus being a safety barrier. 
One example was a car stuck on a level crossing. 
This was reported to the control center, which 
switched on an emergency button and informed the 
train approaching the crossing. The emergency but-
ton automatically - and at once - slows down the 
speed of the trains in the area to 40 km/h. 
In addition to technical and physical elements, the 
barrier definition also covers non-physical elements 
as procedures, inspection, training or drill. Both the 
quality assurance report as a basis for deciding to im-
plement GSM-R and the interviews point at the need 
for developing and adjusting work processes and ed-
ucation. This was relevant for staff both at the GSM-
R communication center, the traffic management 
center and the engine drivers. Several adjustments, 
modifications and development of new procedures 
were necessary after the implementation phase fin-
ishing in 2007.  
One of the informants mentions the need for de-
veloping a new operational organization related to 
the digitalization in parallel with maintaining the old 
one serving the analogue infrastructure. Gradually 
the new organization took over the operation with re-
sponsibility for new equipment, procedures etc. 
(2) Socio-economic efficiency (measured in terms 
of either profitability or cost-effectiveness). As prior 
mentioned, it was no option to keep the old analogue 
system. It was essential to replace it by a digital sys-
tem. Thus, the willingness to pay was relatively high. 
In addition, accidents like the Åsta involve both high 
financial costs in addition to human losses and suf-
fering. 
Regularity and safety may be interrelated. Inci-
dents and accidents often imply traffic delays. The 
font-end operators – the engine drivers – report that 
the new communication equipment onboard the 
trains results in fewer stops and delays. One reason 
is that the now don't have to go outside to call the 
operation central. Another reason is that they daily, 
especially at wintertime, call and report about obsta-
cles like animals and snow/ ice on the track. This pre-
vents accidents and may be solved faster than earlier. 
The train drivers report some cases of accident pre-
vention, where the radio is used to report cars, per-
sons or animals on the track. 
Another aspect of socio-economic efficiency is 
related to the train passengers, service and regularity. 
To be resilient, GSM-R was decided to be a closed 
system, meaning that it should be restricted to solely 
rail communication and rail operators. The new sys-
tem was limited to rail communication between train, 
rail communication network operators and traffic 
controls centers. The reason was to ensure contact in 
emergency situations and the priority of calls be-
tween traffic manager and engine driver. Commer-
cial communication operators were offered the pos-
sibility to use the infrastructure to install their own 
antennas. However, this offer has not been utilized. 
4.4 Strategical success 
Strategical success comprises aspects like sustaina-
bility and relevance.  
(1) Sustainability. After the implementation of 
GSM-R in 2007, some challenges are faced. Gener-
ally, this is related to resilience. One central aspect 
of resilience is redundancy. The interviews identified 
the fact that the existence of one GSM-R control cen-
ter was too vulnerable in case of breakdown of the 
center. This resulted in building an additional center 
(after the GSM-R implementation period) to be used 
in such cases. 
Further, the engine drivers report that they daily 
have used the same phones onboard since the imple-
mentation of GSM-R. They are solid and sustainable.  
In order to be resilient, implementation of new 
technical equipment, GSM-R also had to be accom-
panied by organizational and cultural changes. New 
working processes implied specification of changed 
communication procedures. The engine drivers men-
tion procedures like dialogue with the management 
center before every departure or reports about 
maintenance due to equipment errors or collision. 
Education and operational training in introduced to 
handle deviations and emergency situations. 
(2) Relevance. Affected parties are for instance 
user of the infrastructure – traffic managers and train 
drivers. Related to safety, the traffic manager can im-
mediately stop all trains by one keyboard pressure in 
case of a reported risk. In case of an emergency call 
from a train driver, the speed automatically reduces 
to maximum 40 km/h at the affected distance. 
Further, the equipment is suitable to handle situa-
tions in case of signal errors. Redundancy is achieved 
by using the GSM-R communication equipment 
onboard. Instead of stopping at assumed signal fail-
ure, dialogue with the traffic management center is 
helping to clarify whether it is safe to proceed or 
whether an incident has occurred. 
One drawback related to regularity is the need for 
maintenance. Five times per year the GMS-R center 
discontinue traffic due to maintenance. Some night 
trains must be cancelled. Another vulnerability is 
disappearance of local electric power. Then the base 
station breaks down. Fortunately, this seldom occurs. 
Relevance is also related to political decisions and 
priorities. GSM-R is a central as a basis in subse-
quent digitalization of the rail.  
 
5 Discussion 
The increasing use of resilience approach also imply 
an additional perspective to traditional risk manage-
ment. In the definition presented in session 1, This 
section starts by some comments on this shift. Then 
the three main aspects of resilience are discussed; to 
'absorb shocks', 'ability to adapt', and 'ability to re-
cover'.  
5.1 Resilience understanding – A shift from 
reactive and linear to a proactive and holistic 
approach  
During the last decade the use of the resilience con-
cept has increased enormously. The concept of resil-
ience has roots in many disciplines, and over 300 
definitions are identified. However, these are phases 
or dimensions in most common definitions. Euro-
pean Commission (2018) tries to present an over-
view and classification of resilience understanding. 
The definitions may be classified relation to level of 
complexity (reductionism vs. holism) and conceptual 
orientation (outcome and capacity vs. process and 
capacity). For example, some definitions represent 
more linear models of actions in face of a challeng-
ing situation, while others address a view of holism 
and complexity.  
Further, three separated, albeit partially overlap-
ping domains of CI resilience have emerged: organ-
izational, technological and societal (European Com-
mission, 2018). The discussion in this paper relies on 
a definition emphasizing increased societal complex-
ity. Hollnagel et. al (2015) argue that a resilient sys-
tem should be related to performance and whether it 
can "adjust its functioning prior to, during, or fol-
lowing events (changes, disturbances, and opportu-
nities), and thereby sustain required operations un-
der both expected and unexpected conditions". 
The resilience paradigm implies a shift from a re-
active to a proactive approach to safety. The message 
is to look for what goes well as well as what goes 
wrong (Hollnagel, 2015). We cannot make sure thing 
go right just by preventing them from going wrong.  
5.2 Resilience - To what degree may GSM-R 
absorb shocks? 
This aspect includes reactive and proactive barrier 
elements, and may be describes as: "The ability of a 
system to prepare for, mitigate or prevent negative 
impacts, using predetermined coping responces in 
order to preserve and restore essential basic 
stuctures and functions" (OECD, 2014).  
 
GSM-R is a critical infrastucture, and as as a 
technical system, resilience are related to e.g. the 
ability for physical absorbtion of energy. In a sense 
we can say it does. The equipnet make it possible to 
slow down the engine speed at once in the case of an 
alarm or information of obstacles on the track.  
Further, GSM-R may prevent one fatal accident 
type – train collitions. The most frequent cause of fa-
tal train accidents is signal passed at danger. This 
was also the case in the Åsta accident. GSM-R may 
serve as a barrier element. 
In addition to technical resilience, resilence 
should also include organizational and societal 
perspectives. Organizational resilience includes the 
question regarding prevention and the ability to 
foresee and avoid incident/ accident. In addition to 
being physical, barriers may be non-physical includ-
ing organizational and human elements. During the 
implementation phase of the GSM-R, the project or-
ganization met this challenge by building a parallel 
organization to handling the new, digital infrastruc-
ture. Gradually this replaced the old organization re-
sponsible for the old and analogue system. 
The results further indicate that adjustments were 
needed after the implementation phase. Procedures, 
work processes, inspection and training had to be 
gradually adjusted and developed during and after-
wards.  
5.3 Resilience – How are the ability to adapt? 
This question regards the ability to prevent an 
incidence from becoming worse, or 'cope with 
ongoing trouble'.  
The results indicate that this to some extent may 
the case for technical resilience. The traffic manager 
may communicate with the engine driver and call at-
tention to obstacles like animals, people or obstacles 
on the track. Further, pushing the emergency button 
automatically slows down the speed of trains in the 
actual located area. 
According to Hollnagel et al (2015) in order to 
improve it must be legitimate to within an organiza-
tional culture to allocate resources to reflect, to share 
experiences and to learn. The GSM-R organization 
has created educational and operational training are-
nas for this. As society and technical changes are 
common, such arenas should develop further and 
cover reflection both on past, current and future 
safety challenges. Operational measures should con-
sider, prepare for and adjust everyday performance 
to expected and unexpected condition, including so-
called 'black swans'. Black swans refer to rare and 
unpredictable events (Taleb, 2007). The preparation 
to cope with black swans will require a holistic, in-
terdisciplinary and intercultural approach (Stene et 
al, 2016).   
5.4 Resilience – To what degree have GSM-R 
improved the ability to recover? 
This question is related to the ability recover once an 
incident/ acident has happened, or 'repairing after a 
catastrophe'. 
The results indicate that the infrastructure is well 
functioning in case of emergencies. One challenge to 
many CI infrastructures is that privately owned and 
operated information ITC companies get the respon-
sibility to for services (European Commission, 
2018). The government will not have the control 
while private industry has access to necessary tech-
nical capabilities and information pertaining to the 
CI. Government then either has to provide necessary 
resources itself or to increase regulation. In case of 
the GSM-R implementation, operation and mainte-
nance, the government chose to have control. In this 
sense they can control access and be more resilient.  
The communication network is strictly used by train 
operators. This means that the control centers and en-
gine drivers are interconnected and may easily come 
in contact and communicate directly with each other. 
They will not be disturbed by passenger calls or over-
load by other phone calls. 
Sustainability requires regular and safe operations 
under both expected and unexpected conditions. 
However, to recover and to bounce back. Challenges 
in case of a train accident to respond and recover is 
related to the consequences and what is damaged. 
This is the case of key personnel and technical equip-
ment. The train have to be able to handle the situa-
tion, and it is critical or difficult if e.g. the engine 
driver is badly hurt or killed. The same is the case if 
the train itself or the communication equipment is 
damaged in an accident. 
 
6 Conclusion 
6.1 The evaluation model of CI implementation 
The evaluation is based on a Norwegian model for 
post-evaluation on CI projects. Based on the experi-
ences from this project, the model is regarded a use-
ful evaluation tool. It is important that the evaluation 
is carried out some time after the implementation 
phase is finished. 
The model covers six general evaluation criteria: 
(1) Efficiency covers the project’s outputs in terms 
of cost, time and quality. (2) Effectiveness includes 
whether the project has contributed to these out-
comes. (3) Other impacts include all effects beyond 
the intended effects (the outcome). (4) Relevance 
concerns the need for it. (5) Sustainability calls at-
tention to whether positive effects are likely to per-
sist throughout the expected lifetime of the infra-
structure. (6) Socio-economic efficiency. 
One question is whether this model is suitable and 
adequate to measure resilience, or if new resilience 
guidelines, measurements and tools should be added. 
Resilience focus on safety management to cope with 
complexity under pressure, and where the purpose is 
to achieve dependability, safety, continuity and reg-
ularity. 
6.2 Resilience assessment and the Concept 
evaluation model     
The resilience concept has become increasingly used 
in relation to CI safety in several domains and man-
agement levels. However, still it is necessary to de-
velop a framework systematically relating concepts 
and methods to their relevant scope and domain of 
application (European Commission, 2018). 
The Concept Post-evaluation model is relatively 
new. It focuses on effects of CI investments. The 
model could benefit from expanding the scope to a 
greater extent include questions regarding why ef-
fects are reached or not. The work environment is be-
coming increasingly complex and unpredictable. 
One should pay attention to how they work. Perfor-
mance adjustment and performance variability - 
'work as done' - are thus both normal and necessary 
for a system to function. It is important to pay atten-
tion to how routines and procedures work in every-
day practice at the front-end. 
Regulations, standardization and procedures de-
scribe 'work as imagined' and when things function 
and/or as expected. In addition to focus solely on se-
verity, a resilience approach would recommend to 
study frequent and normal performance which go 
right, and to learn from them. Risk management fo-
cus on maintaining capacity to control and deal with 
adverse events. Innovations are required to deal with 
new types of crises (European Commission, 2018). 
These innovations may complement existing capa-
bilities. Thus, plans and procedures should address 
both expected and unexpected situations that chal-
lenge established responses. 
Disaster management addresses both prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery (Hollnagel et 
al, 2015). In addition to the crash phase, resilience 
covers both the pre- and post-crash phases, and ac-
cordingly proactive and reactive barriers.  
GSM-R may increase the safety of the technical 
system, safety culture and human operators. How-
ever, implementation of the new technical, digital 
system was not enough in itself. Additional measures 
were necessary, including development of a new op-
eration organization, work processes and procedures, 
in addition to education programs and operational 
training. 
The GSM-R infrastructure has contributed to in-
creased resilience. Especially this seems to be the 
case in in order to reduce the consequences in the 
emergency phase. However, the infrastructure and 
the associated organization also seems to have in-
creased the ability to prevent incidents and to recover 
from dangerous situations.  
6.3 Safety and regularity - Future digitalization 
of the rail 
The GSM-R is one of the basic components and com-
munication base in the recent implementation of 
ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management Sys-
tem) which is a common signaling system standard. 
One aim is that GSM-R is used to send and receive 
all information (inclusive safety critical information) 
necessary to keep train traffic schedules. Based on a 
study after the implementation of GSM-R, the resili-
ence of the system has improved including both 
safety and regularity (Johnsen & Veen 2013). Risk 
assessment was performed in 2008 and 2010, and 
here resilience was explored as a strategy to improve 
safety, security and quality of service.  The results 
indicated improved knowledge of emergency re-
sponses. In addition, high stability of the GSM-R 
system supported safety of operations, despite a fire 
incident in 2010. Delays had been minimal, and no 
accidents had happened due to GSM-R. 
One requirement of implementation of new CI rail 
systems is that increased regularity shall not reduce 
safety. On the contrary, safety should not be sacri-
ficed in the need for increased regularity. 
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